Abstract-The present study investigates the difficulty of solving the mathematical problem, namely the DLP (Discrete Logarithm Problem) for ephemeral keys. The DLP is the basis for many public key cryptosystems. The ephemeral keys are used in such systems to ensure security. The DLP defined on a prime field p Z * of random prime is considered in the present study. The most effective method to solve the DLP is the ICM (Index Calculus Method). In the present study, an efficient way of computing the DLP for ephemeral keys by using a new variant of the ICM when the factors of 1 − p are known and small is proposed. The ICM has two steps, a pre-computation and an individual logarithm computation. The pre-computation step is to compute the logarithms of a subset of a group and the individual logarithm step is to find the DLP using the precomputed logarithms. Since the ephemeral keys are dynamic and change for every session, once the logarithms of a subset of a group are known, the DLP for the ephemeral key can be obtained using the individual logarithm step. Therefore, an efficient way of solving the individual logarithm step based on the newly proposed precomputation method is presented and the performance is analyzed using a comprehensive set of experiments. The ephemeral keys are also solved by using other methods, which are efficient on random primes, such as the Pohlig-Hellman method, the Van Oorschot method and the traditional individual logarithm step. The results are compared with the newly proposed individual logarithm step of the ICM. Also, the DLP of ephemeral keys used in a popular password key exchange protocol known as Chang and Chang are computed and reported to launch key recovery attack.
INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the methods of solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) for ephemeral keys. The ephemeral keys may be unique for each session or they may be reused for different sessions of the same party. For example, the ANSI X9.42 standard, which specifies several Diffie-Hellman protocols states that an ephemeral key is a private or public key that is unique for each execution of cryptographic schemes". Other protocols do not place any restrictions on the reuse of ephemeral keys [9] . The ephemeral keys, which are unique for each session, are considered in the present study.
The ephemeral keys, which are used in the Discrete Logarithm based public key cryptosystems, are to ensure the security of the systems. One way of retrieving this key is to solve the mathematically hard problems such as the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). The ephemeral keys are dynamic and change for every session between Alice and Bob while the static keys remain the same and live longer. Since the life time of ephemeral keys is short, it is hard to recover these keys within the short span of time by using the attacks with the target of solving the DLP. Thus the problem of solving the DLP for retrieving the ephemeral keys is formulated.
Let a group (G, *) consists of a set G and a binary operation *. The order of an element, say a , of a finite group G is defined to be with the smallest value t such that 1 = , is known as the DLP. Some of the attacks on the DLP are discussed below. The methods to solve the DLP on P Z * can be divided into two types--the general-purpose and special-purpose methods. The general purpose algorithms include, Shanks baby step -giant step, the Pollard family of algorithms and the Index Calculus Methods. The following paragraphs describe the general-purpose methods. Apart from the exhaustive search to solve the DLP a well known deterministic algorithm is Shank's baby step-giant step algorithm. It requires ) ( n o group operations and space [7] . The Pollard Rho method, which is a probabilistic one, has similar square root running time but avoids large space requirements [11] .
The DLP can be computed in sub exponential time using the ICM, if there is more structure to the group beyond the set of elements and the group operation. Specifically, certain group elements can be labeled as smooth, when it can be factored into a product of group elements from some relatively small factor base. The ICM uses a fixed small set called the factor base B and tries to write elements as a product of members of the factor base B [8] . The base consists of objects which are small and irreducible. In a prime field P F , where we identify the field elements with integers in 0, 1, · · · , p − 1, a factor base consists of all prime numbers less than some prescribed bound. In a field of characteristic 2, n F 2 , where we write field elements as polynomials of degree < n, a factor base consists of all irreducible polynomials of degree less than some prescribed bound.
The analysis of ICM is studied extensively. The efficient way of solving the DLP using the ICM was first presented by Coppersmith and Odlyzko [3] . Another variant of the ICM is the number sieve field and it has an heuristic running time of the form 14, 17, 18] . Introduction of the ICM on an elliptic curve group is a well known open problem [13] . Recently, the ICM was introduced in the DLP for hyper elliptic curves [2] .
The special-purpose algorithms need some additional information apart from g and y to solve the DLP. The attacks that are developed based on the information other than g and y are one way of solving the DLP through trap doors. One of the popular attacks of this kind, namely, the Pohlig-Hellman method [12] [16] presented the difficulty of computing the DLP, which is known to be short on a random prime with the factors of p − 1 consists of small factors along with one large factor (q).
In the present study, a variant of the ICM is proposed to solve the DLP for ephemeral keys. The problem is formulated as follows: Once the logarithms of a subset of group elements are known, the logarithms of the ephemeral keys can be solved by using the individual logarithm phase. Therefore, an efficient way of performing the individual logarithm step based on precomputation step is proposed. The newly proposed algorithms for the ICM are analyzed experimentally. The DLP of ephemeral keys is solved by using other methods, which are efficient on random primes, such as the Pohlig-Hellman method, the traditional individual logarithm step of the ICM and the Van Oorschot method. The results are compared with the newly proposed individual logarithm step of the ICM. Also, the DLP of ephemeral keys used in the Chang and Chang password key exchange protocol are solved. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
The following section presents the Pohlig-Hellman, the ICM and Van Oorschot methods. Section 2 discusses the variant of the ICM and the experimental analysis. Also, the other methods to solve the DLP for ephemeral keys are addressed. Section 3 reviews the Chang and Chang key exchange protocol. Section 4 presents the key recovery from the Chang and Chang password key exchange protocol and section 5 is the conclusion. The logarithms in the small subgroups are solved by using one of the popular square root algorithms. Later the Chinese Remainder Method is used to combine the results i e i i p x mod to retrieve p x mod .
The Index Calculus Method
The Index Calculus Methods are the most prominent collection of algorithms that have successfully used additional knowledge of the underlying groups to provide sub exponential algorithms. The basic idea, which goes back to Kraitchik [8] is that if If we obtain many equations of the above form, and they do not involve too many x i and y i , then the system can be solved.
The algorithm has two steps:
• A pre-computation step, where the logarithms of b g log of all members of the factor base are obtained where g is the generator and b is the element in the factor base.
• A computation step, which tries enough y g a until the result factors over the factor base, thus providing the requested logarithm y g log , where y is the element for which the logarithm is to be computed. [15] .
The pre-computation step itself has two phases • First phase: Find the linear relations relating to the logarithms of the primes in the factor base • Second phase: Solve this linear system using techniques from linear algebra
The general algorithm for the traditional ICM is described below [1] .
General Algorithm for the ICM
INPUT a generator g of a cyclic group G of order n i.e., 1 − p and an element y OUTPUT y g log • pre-computation step -Select a factor base
, which belongs to G such that a significant portion of elements of G can be efficiently expressed as products of elements from S . -Find a linear system using the procedure as given below -The linear system is reduced into smaller size using a structured Gaussian method. This step is an optional one and is used when a large system is generated in the previous step. -Solve this linear system to obtain i g p log .
• 
The Van Oorschot method
Van Oorschot and Wiener [16] proposed an attack on short exponents with the combination of random prime. The algorithm is a combination of the Pohlig-Hellman and Pollard Lambda methods to solve the DLP with the above constraints and it works as follows: Let 
METHODS TO SOLVE THE DLP FOR EPHEMERAL KEYS
In this section a variant of the ICM is proposed. The performance of newly proposed algorithms for the ICM are analyzed and reported. The steps involved in the newly proposed ICM are as follows:-
• A pre-computation step, where the logarithms of all subgroup elements are obtained.
• A computation step, which computes the logarithm of y by combining the logarithms of subgroup elements by using the Chinese Remainder Method.
Performance study and numerical results
In this section the experimental analysis on the new variant of the ICM is presented. The problem is described as follows: First a data file is produced, which contains a list of tuples. A tuple is of the form (m, p, q, g, y) with the following properties:-m lies between 13 and 50 digits, p is a prime, q is the list of factors of p − 1, g is the generator and y is an element of the prime field, such as x g y = , with x to be recovered from g and y. Having built up the data file, the algorithms (pre-computation and individual logarithm step) for a variant of the ICM are implemented and verified on the data file. The selected list of problems and the running time to solve the DLP for y is reported in table 1. The DLP of ephemeral keys can be solved efficiently, once the logarithms of a subset of group are known. Assume the logarithms of a subset of a group i.e., the logarithms of subgroup elements, are computed by using Algorithm-1. Since the logarithms of subgroup elements are known, the DLP for the ephemeral keys can be obtained by using Algorithm-2. This is possible due to the fact that the prime field and the generator are shared between the communicators before starting the sessions. The assumption is that the logarithms of subgroup elements are computed before starting the sessions. The DLP for ephemeral keys is to be computed once the session gets started.
Apart from the proposed individual logarithm step of the ICM, the other methods, such as the traditional individual logarithm phase of the ICM, the conventional Pohlig-Hellman and Van Oorschot methods are used to solve the DLP for ephemeral keys. Since, the pre-computation step is related to the traditional ICM and a variant of the ICM proposed in the present study, the Pohlig-Hellman and the Van Oorschot methods are implemented without considering the precomputation step. The pre-computation step of the traditional individual logarithm step is the conventional pre-computation step of the ICM as mentioned in section 1.3.1. Finally, the exponents (x) are assumed as short for the Van Oorschot method. The running time of the newly proposed individual logarithm step of the ICM is compared with the other methods. Table 2 reports the running time of the above methods. Since the exponents (x) are assumed as short, the Van Oorschot method solves the problem in reduced time. The traditional individual logarithm step needs substantially more time due to the fact that the DLP is solved without considering the additional information such as the factors of p − 1. The Pohlig-Hellman method and the variant of the ICM work with the additional information regarding the factors of p − 1 and their running time depends on the size of the factors of p − 1. The following section discusses the ephemeral key recovery on the Chang and Chang password key exchange protocol.
REVIEW OF THE CHANG AND CHANG NOVEL THREE PARTY KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
The key exchange protocol is one of the most elegant ways of establishing secure communication between a pair of users by using a session key. The session key, which is exchanged between two users assures secure communication for later sessions. The first practical key exchange protocol was proposed by Diffie-Hellman [5] . Since the introduction of key exchange [4] proposed a novel three party encrypted key exchange protocol and claimed the protocol is secure, efficient and practical. This section briefly explains the Chang and Chang novel three party key exchange protocol. The notations used in this protocol are listed below:
• A,B : two communication parties.
• S: the trusted server. • p : a large prime.
• g : a generator of order
: the random exponents chosen by A,B and S, respectively. The procedure followed in Chang-Chang is given below:
Step 1: 
Step 4:
.By using 
A KEY RECOVERY ATTACK ON THE CHANG AND CHANG PROTOCOL
In this section the key recovery attack on the Chang and Chang protocol proposed by R.Padmavathy and Chakravarthy Bhagvati is reviewed [10] . A malicious party B guesses the password of A using an undetectable password guessing attack as proposed by Yoon and Yoo [19] . B uses the password of A for obtaining the session key between A and C, when A and C want to communicate. The following procedure presents the attack in detail.
Step 1: Step3: 
S.
Step4: 
Step5:
and from 
. If successful, C computes the session key
Step7: 4.1 Solving the DLP for the ephemeral keys NA and NB 
By using

CONCLUSION
This paper discussed a new approach to solve the DLP for ephemeral keys. A new variant of the ICM is presented and the performance is analyzed using a comprehensive set of experiments. The Pohlig-Hellman method is the best known method when the factors of p − 1 are small. The ICM is an efficient method for the general DLP. Through the experimental results it is shown that the individual logarithm step of the ICM outperforms the Pohlig-Hellman method for most of the cases. The other methods, which are efficient on random primes, such as the traditional ICM and the Van Oorschot method are also analyzed and compared with the newly proposed method for the ICM. It is also shown that the ephemeral keys of the Chang and Chang password key exchange protocols are solved by using the above methods to recover the session key exchanged between two communicators. The attack can be avoided by selecting the generators of large prime order and the computations are to be restricted to the prime order subgroup of p − 1. 
